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TORTS-ANIMAL OR VEHICLE-
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF
PEDESTRIANS
As the law progresses and evolves, one subject has remained
ever plodding along and always present in the annuals of liti-
gation-the jackass. To the agrarian, this domestic beast is his
laborer and co-worker and is usually found in the barns or
pulling the plow. The courts and the lawyers, however, might
presume that the beast's native habitat is the highway.
Many years ago, due to his presence in the middle of a
travelled road, he was the subject of landmark litigation in the
famous case of Davies v. Mann 1, an English decision of note
in American jurisprudence. Although almost a century has
elapsed, the ass, not to be denied his fame, has once again
appeared; on the highways, and again provoking litigation.
A 1960 Virginia case 2 involved an action for injuries sus-
tained when a mule that the plaintiff was leading was struck
from behind by an automobile driven by the defendant. The
defendant testified that he saw the plaintiff and mule about 900
feet away, but could not see that the mule was on the hard
surface of the roadway. Defendant alleged that the plaintiff
was guilty of contributory negligence under two Virginia
statutes, 3 by walking on the right shoulder of the highway,
leading the mule, and the man and mule together constituted a
pedestrian as defined by statute to face oncoming traffic. The
trial court refused to give instructions to this effect and the
jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff.
I Davies v. Mann, 10 M. & W. 545 (Ex. 1842).
2 Bayne v. Tharpe, 201 Va. 484, 111 S.E. 2d 816 (1960).
3 Va. Code § 46-183 (1950), as amended, § 46.1-171 (1950): Every person riding
a bicycle or an animal upon a roadway and every person driving any animal
shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter applicable to the driver
of a vehicle, except those provisions which by their very nature can have no
application.
Va. Code § 46-247 (1950), as amended, § 46.1-234 (1950).
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The real issue of the case was whether or not the mule was a
pedestrian as contended by the defendant thereby being
contributorily negligent in walking on the hard surface of the
roadway. If the mule were not considered a pedestrian, he had
the same right to the road as other vehicles.
On appeal it was decided that a man and mule together do
not constitute a pedestrian within the meaning of the statute.
Persons leading mules are not permitted to use the sidewalks
and are, of necessity and common sense, not pedestrians within
the meaning of the statute. Therefore, if plaintiff exercised
reasonable care in leading the mule and was not negligent, the
plaintiff was not precluded from walking on either side of the
highway, and there was no error in the lower court's instructions
to that effect.
In its opinion the court relied heavily upon Lawson v.
Fordyce,4 a decision almost on all fours with the instant case. In
the Lawson case the plaintiff was leading a cow when a car com-
ing from the rear failed to sound its horn. As the car passed it
startled the cow, causing it to run over the plaintiff thereby
injuring him. The court commented upon statutory law in
various states, including Virginia, and said:
Necessarily the pedestrians required by statute to
walk on the left-side of the highway do not include
persons afoot who are leading, or are otherwise in
charge of, cows, horses, et at, for such persons with their
charges are not permitted on sidewalks ... 5
We doubt very much that the legislatures of the
states ... intended such statutory provisions to apply to
persons on foot in charge of horses, cows, and other
livestock.., upon the highways. 6
Even if the mule were considered a pedestrian, it should not
affect the outcome of the case. A violation of a safety statute
4 Lawson v. Fordyce, 237 Iowa 28,21 N.W. 2d 69 (1945).
5 Ibid. at 57.
6 Ibid. at 55.
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enacted for the protection of the travelling public should not be
conclusive, if there is no other evidence of negligence contribut-
ing to the accident.7
In an earlier cases decided by the same court as decided the
present litigation, plaintiff was struck from behind by an auto-
mobile while he was walking dose to a highway in violation of
a statute9 requiring pedestrians to keep to the far extreme of the
shoulder. It was nevertheless held that whether or not such
violation be a remote cause which proximately contributes to
the injury is a question for the jury. The court instructed the
jury that plaintiff would not be guilty of contributory negli-
gence as a matter of law if he were using that degree of care a
person of ordinary prudence under like circumstances would
use.
A pedestrian lawfully on the highway may rely upon reason-
able care of automobile drivers and is not negligent as a matter
of law in failing to anticipate a driver's negligence. 1 o Merely
because a pedestrian is walking on the side of the road in
violation of a safety statute, does not render him contributorily
negligent and as a matter of law barring recovery, since recovery
can still be had under the "last dear chance doctrine."" This
doctrine is not foreign to the Virginia courts and has been
applied to pedestrians and their use of the highways in violation
of safety statutes. 2
Statutes regulating the travel of pedestrians along public
highways generally prescribe that the pedestrian shall keep to
the left hand edge of the highway. The courts are not entirely
in accord as to the effect of a pedestrian's failure to comply with
such statute in determining liability for injuries. Some courts "3
7Salmondon Torts, 8th Ed., 382 (1934).
8 Crouse v. Pugh, 188 Va. 156,49 S.E. 2d 421 (1948).
9 Va. Code § 2154 (126) (g) (1942).
10 Colton v. Stolley, 124 Neb. 855, 248 N.W. 384 (1933).
11 Hooker v. Schuler, 45 Idaho 83, 260 P. 1027 (1927): Greear v. Noland Co., 197
Va. 233, 89 S.E. 2d 49 (1955).
12 Clay v. Bishop, 182 Va. 746, 30 S.E. 2d 585 (1944).
13 Perhaps the leading case which holds a violation of a statute which applies to
the facts of "negligence per se" is Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 126 N.E.
814 (1920).
RECENT CASES
have taken the view that such violation is negligence as a matter
of law, while other courts'I 4have declared it prima facie negli-
gence, or merely evidence of negligence. However, all courts
agree that the mere violation of a statute, whether negligence
per se,prima facie negligence, or evidence of negligence, will not
bar recovery on the ground of contributory negligence unless
the violation was a proximate cause of the injuries sustained by
the pedestrian. 1 s It is generally agreed that the question as to
whether the violation was a proximate cause is for the jury, and
recovery will not be precluded on the ground of contributory
negligence if the violation of the statute is not a proximate
cause of the injury. 16
Why the decision of the court in the instant case revolved
around whether the mule would or would not be considered a
pedestrian is not fully apparent. The "last dear chance doc-
trine" was not mentioned in the opinion though this case would
appear to be an ideal situation for its application.
Starting with Davies v. Mann,'1 it was held that the con-
tributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the
action if it is shown that the defendant might by the exercise
of reasonable care and prudence have avoided the consequences
of the injured party's negligence. In that case Lord Abinger,
C.B., said:
The defendant has not denied that the ass was law-
fully in the highway, and therefore we must assume it to
have been lawfully there. But, even were it otherwise, it
would have made no difference, for as the defendant
might by proper care have avoided injuring the animal
and did not, he is liable for the consequences of his negli-
gence, though the animal might have been improperly
there. 1 s
'4 For a well reasoned opinion rejecting the per se rule, and holding a violation of
a criminal statute designed to avoid injuries of the kind which occurred, is
only evidence of negligence, see, Evers v. Davis, 86 N.J.L. 196, 90 A. 677(1914).
15 4 A.L.R. 2d 1256 (1944).
1o Gregory v. Daniel, 173 Va. 442, 4 S.E. 2d 786 (1939).
17 Davies v. Mann, 10 M. & W. 545 (Ex. 1842).
18 Ibid. at 547.
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And as Park, B. further observed:
Although the ass might have been wrong fully there,
still the defendant was bound to go along the road at
such a pace as would be likely to prevent mischief. 19
Although in the present case and in more recent times it is
usually not necessary to go as far as the court did in the Davies
case, it is sufficient to say that the principle therein announced
has met with almost universal favor. Although it has been
criticized by some text writers, there has girdled the globe a
band of sympathy for Davies's immortal "critter." The law as
enunciated in that case has come to stay, and the principle has
been clearly and accurately stated as: "The party who last has a
clear opportunity of avoiding the accident, notwithstanding the
negligence of his opponent, is considered solely responsible for
"120it. . . "
In the instant decision,21 the defendant observed theplaintiff
and the mule 900 feet away. He discovered the plaintiff in a
position where injury was possible unless he used ordinary care
to prevent it, and the duty to use such care arose wholly with-
out reference to the character of his conduct before the dis-
covery. 22 Defendant was clearly negligent which the court and
jury rightly found.
The decision seems to be consistent with the prior cases,
although it solved the matter on more anomolous conside-
rations. Why the court deemed to place the mule in a vehicular
category, rather than basing its consideration on more es-
tablished doctrines is not fully perceived. Justice was effectu-
ated by a unique application of the law.
J. J. Mc.
19 Ibid. at 547.
20 2 Quarterly Law Review, 207 (1955).
21 Bayne v. Tharpe, 201 Va. 484, 111 $.E. 2d 816 (1960).
22 Sisti v. Thompson, 149 Tex. 189, 229 S.W. 2d 210 (1954).
